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Abstract. We discuss Birnbaum’s result, its relevance to statistical
reasoning, Mayo’s objections and the result in [Electron. J. Statist. 7
(2013) 2645–2655] that the proof of this result doesn’t establish what
is commonly believed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The result established in Birnbaum (1962), that if
one accepts the frequentist principles of sufficiency
(S) and conditionality (C), then one must accept
the likelihood principle (L), has been an issue in the
foundations of statistics for 50 years. Many statisti-
cians and philosophers of science accept Birnbaum’s
theorem as a logical fact because the proof is sim-
ple and, if they follow a pure likelihood or Bayesian
prescription for inference, it doesn’t violate the way
they think statistical analyses should be conducted.
Many frequentist statisticians reject the result basi-
cally because they don’t like the consequence that
frequentist evaluations of statistical methodologies
are irrelevant.
In the end, an acceptable theory of inference has
to be based on sound logic with no appeals to ex
cathedra principles. Any principles used as part of
forming such a theory have to have strong justifi-
cations and produce results that are free of para-
doxes and contradictions. For example, the princi-
ple of conditional probability, which says we replace
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P (A) as the measure of belief that event A is true
by P (A | C) after being told that event C has oc-
curred, seems like a basic principle of inference that,
with careful application, is sound.
Does the likelihood principle carry the same
weight in a theory of inference as the principle of
conditional probability? We don’t think so and we
will later argue that a somewhat weakened version
is really just a consequence of the principle of con-
ditional probability. Given that such principles can
have a significant influence on what we view as cor-
rect statistical reasoning, it is important to examine
the justifications for the likelihood principle, and
Birnbaum’s theorem is commonly cited as such, to
see if these are correct.
Another principle cited in Mayo’s paper is the
principle of frequentism. So what is the justification
for this principle? Generally, this seems to be based
on the belief that it typically produces sensible sta-
tistical methods, although, as we will subsequently
discuss, the story seems incomplete and unclear. If
the principle of frequentism is correct, we need to
have a good argument for it and a much more com-
plete development of the theory.
The relevance of frequentism to Mayo’s paper lies
in the author’s position that Birnbaum’s argument
is basically a violation of the principle. An argument
is provided for why the joint application of S and
C used in Birnbaum’s proof constitute such a vio-
lation. I accept Mayo’s reasoning. In fact, I think it
is somewhat similar to the argument put forward in
Evans, Fraser and Monette (1986) that the applica-
tions of S and C in the proof are incorrect because S
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discards as irrelevant precisely the information used
by C to form the conditional model. So the justifi-
cations for S and C contradict one another in the
proof and this doesn’t seem right. This contradiction
is avoided if one adopts the principle put forward in
Durbin (1970), that we should restrict to ancillaries
that are functions of a minimal sufficient statistic,
and then Birnbaum’s proof fails.
As we will discuss in Section 3, however, the issue
in Birnbaum’s argument is not really with S and C
together, but rather with C itself and with what is
actually proved. A very broad hint that this is the
case is provided in Evans, Fraser andMonette (1986)
where, using the same style of argument as Birn-
baum, it is “proved” that accepting C alone is equiv-
alent to accepting L. So Durbin’s point doesn’t save
the day even if we accept it. Actually, I don’t think
the arguments in Mayo’s paper, or in Evans, Fraser
and Monette (1986), completely dispense with Birn-
baum’s theorem either. They just reinforce the un-
settling feeling that something is wrong somewhere.
Section 3 contains an outline of Evans (2013) that,
for me at least, definitively settles the issue of what
is wrong with Birnbaum’s result and does this math-
ematically. As will be apparent from Section 2, how-
ever, it is clear that I believe that a proper prior is
a necessary part of formally correct statistical rea-
soning. So why would a Bayesian want to invali-
date Birnbaum’s result? This is because the result,
as usually stated, is not logically correct. Any valid
theory has to have sound, logical foundations and
so we don’t want any faulty reasoning being used to
justify that theory. In fact, Birnbaum’s result even
misleads, as we’ve heard it said that model check-
ing and checking for prior-data conflict violate the
likelihood principle and so should not be carried out.
Both of these activities are a necessary part of a sta-
tistical analysis. For this is how we deal, at least in
part, with the subjectivity inherent in a statistical
analysis due to the choices made by a statistician.
This point, at least with respect to model checking,
is also made in Mayo’s paper and I think it is an
excellent one.
For proper Bayesians, a form of the likelihood
principle is a consequence of the principle of con-
ditional probability, a far more important princi-
ple. Applying the principle of conditional proba-
bility to the joint probability model for the model
parameter and data after observing the data, we
have that probability statements about the model pa-
rameter depend on the sampling model and data
only through the likelihood (note the emphasis). Of
course, the likelihood map is minimal sufficient so
there is nothing surprising in this.
2. BIRNBAUM AND EVIDENCE
There is an aspect of Birnbaum’s work in this area
that is particularly noteworthy. This is his emphasis
on trying to characterize statistical evidence con-
cerning the true value of the model parameter as
expressed by the function Ev. Consider the pairs
(M,x), where M = {fθ : θ ∈ Θ} is a set of prob-
ability distributions indexed by parameter θ ∈ Θ
and x is observed data coming from a distribution
in M . Then Birnbaum (1962) writes Ev(M1, x1) =
Ev(M2, x2) to mean that the evidence in (M1, x1) is
the same as the evidence in (M2, x2) whenever cer-
tain conditions are satisfied. We require here that
M1 andM2 have the same parameter space, but this
can be weakened to include models with parameter
spaces that are bijectively equivalent.
The principles S,C and L are considered as possi-
ble partial characterizations of statistical evidence.
For example, if (M1, x1) and (M2, x2) are related via
S, then Birnbaum says that, for frequentist statisti-
cians, Ev(M1, x1) =Ev(M2, x2) and similarly for C.
Birnbaum is careful to say that Ev does not char-
acterize what statistical evidence is, it is a kind of
“equivalence relation” (see Section 3).
In essence Birnbaum brings us to the heart of the
matter in statistical inference. What is statistical ev-
idence or, more appropriately, how do we measure
it? It seems collectively we talk about it, but we
rarely get down to details and really spell out how
we are supposed to handle this concept. Perhaps the
closest to doing this is the pure likelihood theory, as
discussed, for example, in Royall (1997), but this
is only a definition of relative evidence when com-
paring two values of the full model parameter. For
marginal parameters, this approach uses the profile
likelihood as the only general way to compare the
evidence for different values and this is unsatisfac-
tory from many points of view. For example, a pro-
file likelihood function is not generally a likelihood
function.
For a frequentist theory of statistical inference, as
opposed to a theory of statistical decision, it seems
essential that a general method for measuring sta-
tistical evidence be provided that can be applied in
any particular problem. The p-value is often used as
a frequentist measure of evidence against a hypoth-
esis, but, for a variety of reasons, it does not seem
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to be appropriate. For example, we need a measure
that can also provide evidence for something being
true and not just evidence against, given that we
have assumed that the true distribution is in M .
If we add a proper prior to the ingredients, then
it seems we can come up with sensible measures
of evidence. For evidence, as expressed by observed
data in statistical problems, is what causes beliefs
to change and so we can measure evidence by mea-
suring change in belief. For example, if we are in-
terested in the truth of the event A, and this has
prior probability P (A)> 0, then after observing C,
the principle of conditional probability leads to the
posterior probability P (A | C) as the appropriate
expression of beliefs about A. Accordingly, we mea-
sure evidence by the change in belief from P (A)
to P (A | C). A simple principle of evidence says
that we have evidence for the truth of A when
P (A | C) > P (A), evidence against the truth of A
when P (A | C)< P (A) and no evidence one way or
the other when P (A | C) = P (A). This principle is
common in discussions about evidence in the philos-
ophy of science and it seems obviously correct.
Of course, we also want to know how much
evidence we have and this has led to a vari-
ety of different measures based on (P (A), P (A |
C)). The Bayes factor BF(A | C) = P (Ac)P (A |
C)P (Ac)/P (A)P (Ac | C) is one such measure, as
BF(A | C) > 1 if and only if P (A | C) > P (A) and
bigger values mean more evidence in favor of A be-
ing true. A central question associated with this,
and other measures of evidence, is how to cali-
brate its values, as in when is BF(A | C) big and
when is it small. Actually, we prefer measuring evi-
dence via the relative belief ratio RB(A |C) = P (A |
C)/P (A), as the associated mathematics and the
calibration of its values are both simpler. The gener-
alization to continuous contexts is effected by taking
limits and then both measures agree. A full theory
of inference, both estimation and hypothesis assess-
ment, can be built based on this measure of evi-
dence together with a very natural calibration. This
is discussed in Baskurt and Evans (2013). Of course,
many will not like this because it involves proper pri-
ors, and so is subjective and supposedly not scien-
tific. Alternatively, some may complain that priors
are somehow hard to come up with.
In reality, all of statistics, excepting the data when
it is properly collected, is subjective. We choose
models and we choose priors. What is important is
that any choice we make, as part of a statistical
analysis, be checkable against the objective data to
ensure the choice at least make sense. We check the
model by asking whether or not the data is surpris-
ing for each distribution in the model, and there are
many well-known procedures for doing this. Perhaps
not so familiar is that we can also check a proper
prior by asking whether or not the true value is in
a region of relatively low prior probability. Proce-
dures for doing this consistently are developed in
Evans and Moshonov (2006) and Evans and Jang
(2011a). In fact, there are even logical approaches to
modifying priors when prior-data conflict is found,
as discussed in Evans and Jang (2011b). Moreover,
with a suitable definition of evidence, we can mea-
sure a priori whether or not a prior is inducing bias
into a problem; see Baskurt and Evans (2013). So
subjectivity is not really the issue. We do our best
to assess and control its effects, and maybe that is
part of the role of statistics in science, but in the
end it is an unavoidable aspect of any statistical in-
vestigation.
It is undoubtedly true that it is possible to write
down complicated models for which it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe an elicitation
procedure in an application that leads to a sensible
choice of a prior. But what does this say about our
choice of model? It seems that we do not understand
the effects of parameters in the model on the mea-
surements we are taking sufficiently well to develop
such a procedure. That is certainly possible, and
perhaps even common, but it doesn’t speak well for
the modeling process and it shouldn’t be held up as
a criticism of what should be the gold standard for
inference. An analogous situation arises with data
collection where we know the gold standard is ran-
dom sampling from the population(s) to which our
inferences are to apply and, when we are interested
in relationships among variables, controlled alloca-
tion of the values of predictors to sampled units.
The fact that this is rarely, if ever, achieved doesn’t
cause us to throw out the baby with the dirty bath
water. Gold standards serve as guides that we strive
to attain and analyses that don’t just need to be
suitably qualified.
Our main point in this section is that the prob-
lem of measuring statistical evidence is the central
issue in developing a theory of statistical inference.
It seems that Birnbaum realized this and was search-
ing for a way to accomplish this goal when he came
upon what appeared to be a remarkable result.
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3. WHAT’S WRONG WITH BIRNBAUM’S
RESULT?
Perhaps everybody who has read the proof of
Birnbaum’s theorem is surprised at its simplicity.
In fact, this is one of the reasons it is so convincing,
as there does not appear to be a logical flaw in the
proof. As Mayo has noted, however, there are rea-
sons to be doubtful of, if not even reject, the result
as being valid within the domain of any sensible the-
ory of statistical inference. Still suspicions linger, as
the formulation seems so simple.
As we will now explain, the result proved is not
really the result claimed. If we want to treat Birn-
baum’s theorem and its proof as a piece of math-
ematics, then we have to be precise about the in-
gredients going into it. It is the imprecision in Birn-
baum’s formulation that leads to a faulty impression
of exactly what is proved. This is more carefully ex-
plained in Evans (2013), but we can give a broad
outline here.
Suppose we have a set D. A relation R on D
is any subset R ⊂D ×D. Meaningful relations ex-
press something and (d1, d2) ∈R means that d1 and
d2 share some relevant property. Let I denote the
set of all model–data pairs (M,x). So, for exam-
ple, we can consider S as a relation on I by saying
the pair ((M1, x1), (M2, x2)) ∈ S ⊂ I × I whenever
(M1, x1) and (M2, x2) have equivalent minimal suf-
ficient statistics. Similarly, C and L are relations
on I .
An equivalence relation R on D is a relation that
is reflexive: (d, d) ∈ R for all d ∈ D, symmetric:
(d1, d2) ∈R implies (d2, d1) ∈R, and transitive: (d1,
d2), (d2, d3) ∈R implies (d1, d3) ∈R. It is reasonable
to say that, whatever property is characterized by
relation R, when R is an equivalence relation, then
(d1, d2) ∈R means that d1 and d2 possess the prop-
erty to the same degree. It is easy to prove that S
and L are equivalence relations but C and S∪C are
not equivalence relations; see Evans (2013).
Associated with an arbitrary relation R on D is
the smallest equivalence relation on D containing
R, which we will denote by R¯. Clearly, R¯ is the
intersection of all equivalence relations containing
R. But R¯ can also be characterized in another way
that is key to Birnbaum’s proof.
Lemma. If R is a reflexive relation on D, then
R¯ = {(x, y) :∃n,x1, . . . , xn ∈ D with x = x1, y = xn
and (xi, xi+1) ∈R or (xi+1, xi) ∈R}.
Note that S and C are both reflexive and, thus,
S ∪C is reflexive.
In Birnbaum’s proof, he starts with ((M1, x1),
(M2, x2)) ∈L, namely, these pairs have proportional
likelihoods. Birnbaum constructs the mixture model
(Birnbaumization)M∗ and then argues that we have
that ((M1, x1), (M
∗, (1, x1))) ∈ C, ((M
∗, (1, x1)),
(M∗, (2, x2))) ∈ S and ((M
∗, (2, x2)), (M2, x2)) ∈ C.
Since C ⊂ S ∪ C and S ⊂ S ∪ C, by the Lemma,
this proves that L⊂ S ∪C and this is all that Birn-
baum’s argument establishes. Since S ∪ C ⊂ L and
L is an equivalence relation, we also have L= S ∪C.
As shown in Evans (2013), it is also true that S ∪C
is properly contained in L, so there is some content
to the proof. In prose, Birnbaum’s proof establishes
the following: if we accept S, and we accept C, and
we accept all the equivalences generated by these
principles jointly, then we accept L. Certainly ac-
cepting S and C is not equivalent to accepting L
since S ∪ C is a proper subset of L. We need the
additional hypothesis and there doesn’t appear to
be any good reason why we should accept this as
part of a theory of statistical inference. It is easy
to construct relations R where R¯ is meaningless. So
we have to justify the additional pairs we add to
a relation when completing it to be an equivalence
relation.
It is interesting to note that the argument sup-
posedly establishing the equivalence of C and L in
Evans, Fraser and Monette (1986) also proceeds in
the same way using the method of the Lemma. Since
C is properly contained in L, this proof establishes
that C¯ = L. So in fact, S is irrelevant in Birnbaum’s
proof. The problem with the principles S and C, as
partial characterizations of statistical evidence, lies
with C and the fact that it is not an equivalence
relation. That C is not an equivalence relation is
another way of expressing the well-known fact that,
in general, a unique maximal ancillary doesn’t exist.
The result C¯ = L does have some content. To be a
valid characterization of evidence in the context of
I , we will have to modify C so that it is an equiv-
alence relation. The smallest equivalence relation
containing C is L and this is unappealing, at least
to frequentists, as it implies that repeated sampling
properties are irrelevant for inference. Another nat-
ural candidate for a resolution is the largest equiv-
alence relation contained in C that is compatible
with all the equivalence relations based on maximal
ancillaries. This is given by the equivalence relation
based on the laminal ancillary. From Basu (1959),
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ancillary statistic a is a laminal ancillary if it is a
function of every maximal ancillary and any other
ancillary with this property is a function of a. The
laminal ancillary is essentially unique. It is unclear
how appealing this resolution would be to frequen-
tists, but there don’t seem to be any other natural
candidates.
Many authors, including Mayo, refer to the weak
conditionality principle which restricts attention to
ancillaries that are physically part of the sampling.
In such a case we would presumably write our mod-
els differently so as to reflect the fact that this sam-
pling occurred in stages. In other words, the uni-
verse is different than I , the one Birnbaum consid-
ered. There doesn’t seem to be anything controver-
sial about such a principle and it is well motivated by
the two measuring instruments example and many
others.
We don’t believe, however, that the weak condi-
tionality principle resolves the problem with con-
ditionality more generally. For example, how does
weak conditionality deal with situations like Exam-
ple 2-2 in Fraser (2004) and many others like it?
Conditioning on an ancillary seems absolutely es-
sential if we are to obtain sensible inferences in such
examples, but there doesn’t appear to be any phys-
ical aspect of the sampling that corresponds to the
relevant ancillary.
Many frequentist statisticians ignore conditional-
ity, but, as noted in Fraser (2004), this is not log-
ical. The theme in conditional inference is to find
the right hypothetical sequence of repeated samples
to compare the observed sample to. This takes us
back to our question concerning the principle of fre-
quentism: why are we considering repeated samples
anyway? A successful frequentist theory of inference
requires at least a resolution of the problems with
conditionality. The lack of such a resolution leads
to doubts as to the validity of the basic idea that
underlies frequentism.
Issues concerning ancillaries are not irrelevant to
Bayesians, as they have uses in model checking and
checking for prior-data conflict. Notice that the prin-
ciple of conditional probability does not imply that
these activities need refer to any kind of posterior
probabilities and it is perfectly logical for these to
be based on prior probabilities. For example, model
checking can be based on the distribution of an an-
cillary or the conditional distribution of the data
given a minimal sufficient. Of course, C is not rel-
evant for proper Bayesian probability statements
about θ, as the principle of conditional probability
implies that we condition on all of the data.
We acknowledge that it is possible that the prob-
lems with C might be fixable or even eliminated
through a better understanding of what we are
trying to accomplish in statistical analyses—these
aren’t just problems in mathematics. We can’t re-
sist noting, however, that the simple addition of a
proper prior to the ingredients does the job, at least
for inference.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Mayo’s paper contains a number of insightful com-
ments and, more generally, it helps to focus at-
tention on what is the most important question in
statistics, namely, what is the right way to formu-
late a statistical problem and carry out a statistical
analysis? To a certain extent, Birnbaum’s result has
been an impediment in moving forward toward de-
veloping a theory of inference that has a solid foun-
dation. It is good to have such underbrush removed
from the discussion. We have to give great credit to
Birnbaum, however, for his focus on what is impor-
tant in achieving this goal, namely, the measurement
of statistical evidence. That his theorem has lasted
for so long is a testament to the difficulties involved
in this task.
In general, we need a strong foundation for a the-
ory of statistical inference rather than principles, of-
ten not clearly stated, that have only some vague,
intuitive appeal. The only way we can determine
whether or not an instance of statistical reasoning
is correct lies within the context of a sound theory.
That two statistical analyses based on the same data
and addressing the same question can be deemed to
be correct and yet come to different conclusions is
not a contradiction. Statistics tells us that we simply
must collect more data to resolve such differences.
In our view, the role of statistics in science is to ex-
plain how to reason correctly in statistical contexts.
Without a strong theory we can’t do that.
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